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[L. A. No. 24880. In Bank. July 17, 1958.]

EVERETT T. PLUMER, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent;
MARGARET L. PLUMER, Real Party in Interest.
[1] Divorce-Enforcement of Awards-Execution: Oontempt Proceedings-Punishment.-Where a husband and wife bargain
with each other and agree that the terms of their contract shall
thereupon and thenceforth grant, delimit and exclusively define
their respective rights and obligations inter
then it is to the
contract alone, and to conventional civil proceedings for the
enforcement of contract rights, that they must look for a
remedy in the event of breach; inclusion of such contract in a
divorce judgment may furnish a basis for subsequent proceedings leading to issuance of a writ of execution, but cannot
support a commitment to imprisonment for failure to pay the
judgment debt.
[2] ld.-Enforcement of Awards-Oontempt Proceedings-PUDishment.-Payments provided in a properly settlement agreement
. which are found to constitute an adjustment of property interests rather than a severable provision for alimony should be
held to fan within the proscription against imprisonment for
debt; if the obligation sought to be enforced is contractual
and negotiated, as distinguished from marital and imposed
by law, even though the contract relates to marriage obligations, the remedy must be appropriate to the right asserted.
[8] ld.-Enforcement of Awards-Contempt Proceedings-Punishment.-Payments which fan into the category of law-imposed
alimony or separate maintenance are based on the statutory
obligation of marital support,may be modified by the court on
a proper showing, ordinarily terminate with the death of
either party, and may be held not to constitute a "debt" within
the meaning of the constitutional provision against imprisonment for debt.
[4] ld.-Enforcement of Awards-Oontempt Proceedings-Punishment.-Where a proPerty settlement agreement between hUIlband and wife incorporated in a divorce decree is integrated,
but the order for wife and tlhild support based thereon was
subject to modification in accordance with the express terms

,e,

~.

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 252 et seq.; Am.
Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 666 et seq.
McX. Dig. References: [1] Divorce, 11249, 266; [2-4] Divorce,
1266; [5] Divorce,§203; [6,8] Divorce,§293; [7] Divorce,§300.
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of the agreement, which provides that the court cannot con- I
sider an increase in the wife's income as "a changed condi- •
tion" unless her income exceeds "the monthly average of
$250," the support obligations, whether as originally lIIJr8ed on
by the parties or as they might be subsequently modified by !
court order pursuant to the terms of the agreement, are con- '
tractual and negotiated as distinguished from marital and :
law-imposed, and the enforcement of such payments by'
contempt proceedings is precluded by the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for dcbt.
Id.-Permanent AlimOD7-E1feet of Agreement of Parties.A provision in a property settlement agreement between husband and wife incorporated in a divorce decree that monthly
payments for the wife were to continue for a fixed period of
five years regardless of the wife's remarriage at any time
within that period, and that the court could not terminate
but could only modify, subject to contractual limitation, such
payments, showed that the payments represented the result of
a bargain negotiated by the spouses in adjustment of their
interests in their property settlement rather than the mere
recognition of a law-imposed obligation.
IeL-Support of Ohildren-E1fect of Agreement of Parties.The law imposes an obligation on a father to furnish child
support, and the law-imposed obligation cannot be contracted
away by the parents.
IeL-Bupport of Ohildren-Kodiflcation of AlloWaDce.-Where
the obligation to pay an agreed amount for child support is
made an integral pari of a property settlement agreement
incorporated in a divorce decree, the payments ordinarily are
Dot subject to reduction, but they may be increased by the
court if the child's welfare requires it, and that without regard
to the liabilities of the parties or their rights "'fer ae under
the agreement.
Id.-Bupport of Ohlldren-E1fect of Agreement of Parties.While a child support obligation could be reduced by virtue of
an agreement of the parties incorporated in a divorce decree,
a contractual limitation on the court's power to make any
reduction clearly stamps the obligation for child support payments as a contractual obligation rather than a law-imposed
obligation.

PROCEEDING to review an order of the Superior Court of
L'Os Angeles County vacating suspension of a sentence for
contempt and ordering the sentence "into effect forthwith."
Orders adjudging petitioner in contempt and vacating suspension of sentence thereon, annulled.
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James E. West, Jr., and Steven Edmondson for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Hahn, Ross & Saunders and E. Loyd Saunders for Real
Party in Interest.
SPENCE, J.-Petitioner seeks annulment of an order of
the respondent court vacating the suspension of a sentence for
contempt and ordering the sentence "into effect forthwith."
Said sentence had been imposed upon petitioner for his failure
to make certain payments for the support of his former wife
and his child as provided in the spouses' agreement and decree
of divorce. He contends that enforcement of his obligations
thereunder through contempt proceedings constitutes a violation of the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment
for debt. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) Our review of the
record leads us to the conclusion that petitioner's contention
must be sustained.
On September 22, 1954, petitioner and his then wife entered
into an agreement "to effect a final and complete settlement of
their respective property rights, support, alimony and custody
of their child with reference to their marital status and to
each other." The agreement obligated petitioner to pay to
his wife $200 a month as alimony and an additional $200 a
month for the support of their child until the age of majority.
The obligation for alimony payments was to cease upon the
wife's "death or remarriage," except that in the case of the
wife's remarriage such payments should "be continued until
five (5) years from Septemher 25, 1954," though she "may
have remarried within said period of time." It was further
provided that so long as the wife'8 earnings or other income
did not exceed the monthly average of $250, any increase
in her income would not be considered a "changed condition"
in connection with any attempt by petitioner to obtain a reduction in the monthly support -payments for the wife or child.
Each party released the other from all present and future
claims and rights to support, separate maintenance, alimony.
court costs, attorneys' fees, and all properly rights of any kind
except as the agreement provided.
On November I, 1954. an interlocutory decree of divorce
was entered, approving the agreement and ordering petitioner
to pay the specified sums. On Spptember 28, 1955, after finding that petitioner had the ability to comply, the court adjudged him guilty of contempt in failing to make the payments
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as ordered and sentenced him to five days in the county jan.
The sentence was ordered suspended on condition that he make
the subsequently accruing payments and also an additional
payment of $10 a month to apply on the arrearages.
On December 11, 1955, petitioner obtained an order directing the wife to show cause why the payments for support of
the wife and child should not be reduced on the ground that
his income had materially decreased. At the hearing the wife
moved to dismiss on the ground that the support payments
had been ordered pursuant to an integrated property settlement agreement and could be reduced only in conformity with
the provisions of the agreement relating to modification, and
that these did not encompass a decrease in petitioner's income
as a basis for modification. The trial court thereafter dismissed the order to show cause. Petitioner appealed, contending that the agreement was not integrated but that even if it
was, a material reduction in his income was a ground for
modification within the express provisions of the agreement.
This court reversed the order dismissing petitioner's application for modification, holding that although the decree was
based upon an integrated agreement, the monthly payments
specified in the decree were subject to modification by the
court since the parties had "expressly so provided" in the
agreement. (Plumer v. Plumer, 48 Cal.ld 820, 825-826 [313
P.ld 549].)
During the pendency of the appeal, petitioner appeared in
the trial court several times for the purpose of determining
his compliance with, the terms of suspension of the contempt
order. At the various hearings petitioner produced, over
objection, evidence as to his financial circumstanct'S seeking to
show that although he was not making the support payments
in accordance with the terms of the order of suspension, he
was complying to the best of his ability. On May 13, 1957,
following the commissioner's findings and recommendations,
the court made its order continuing the suspension of sentence.
The former wife filed exceptions thereto, primarily premised
upon the record of payments, showing that petitioner had
failed to comply, with the terms of said suspension. The
matter was submitted and on June 13, 1957, the court vacated
its May 13 order and ordered the contempt sentence "into
effect forthwith."
The determinative question is whether the constitutional
provision against imprisonment for debt (Cal. Const., art. I,
§ 15) precludes the use of contempt proceedings to enforce
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petitioner's obligations under the divorce decree and property
settlement agreement. As above noted, this agreement was
held to be "clearly integrated!' (Plumer v. Plumer, supra,
48 Ca1.2d 820.) "It deals both with rights to marital property and rights to support. The parties have set forth their
purpose 'to effect a final and complete settlement of their ...
rights ... with reference to their marital status and to each
other.' They have released each other from all claims arising
out of the marital relationship except as provided in the
agreement." (Ibid. at p. 825.)
[1] In Bradley v. Superior Court, 48 Cal.2d 509 [310
P.2d 634], the remedy of contempt was denied where payments to a former wife were deemed "an inseverable part of
an integrated adjustment of all property relations of the
parties and not . . . a severable provision for alimony."
(P.518.) This court said at page 521: "[W]here the parties
bargain with each other and agree that the terms of their
contract shall thereupon and thenceforth grant, delimit and
exclusively define their respective rights and obligations inter
se, then it is to the contract alone, and to conventional civil
proceedings for the enforcement of contract rights, that they
must look for a remedy in the event of breach. Inclusion
of such a contract in a judgment of divorce may furnish a
basis for subsequent proceedings leading to issuance ofa writ
of execution but cannot support a commitment to imprisonment for failure to pay the judgment debt." [2] And at
page 522, it is declared to be "the better view" that "payments provided in a property settlement agreement which are
found to constitute an adjustment of property interests, rather
than a severable provision for alimony, should be held to fall
within the constitutional proscription against imprisonment
for debt. That is, if the obligation sought to be enforced
is contractual and negotiated, as distinguished from marital
and imposed by law, even though the contract relates to
marriage obligations, the r«:medy must be appropriate to thc
right asserted. [3] Payinents which fall into the category
of law-imposed alimony or separate maintenance are based
upon the statutory obligation of marital support, may be
modified by the court upon a proper showing, ordinarily terminate with the death of either party, and may properly
be held not to constitute a 'debt' within the meaning of the
constitutional provision."
[4] In the present case, the provision for monthly support
payments for both the wife and the child could be reduced by
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court order, but only because tbe parties had "expressly flO
provided," and therefore any limitations embodied in their
agreement constituted limitations upon the court's power to
equate the support provisions of the decree with the lawimposed obligations as distinguished from the parties' contractual obligations. (Plumer v. Plumer, supra, 48 Ca1.2d
"820, 825.) While the "plain language" of their agreement
indicated that "the parties contemplated modification upon
an adequate showing of changed circumstances," there was the
express limitation to the effect that the court could not
consider an increase in the wife's income as •• a changed
condition" unless her income exceeded "the monthly average
of $250." (Ibid. at p. 826.) If the provisions of the agreement and decree for monthly payments had been severable
provisions for alimony and child support, unencumbered by
any such contractual limitation, the court might have considered any change in the wife's income as a changed circumstance. Accordingly, petitioner's obligations, whether as
originally agreed upon by the parties or as they might be
subsequently modified by court order pursuant to the terms
of the parties' agreement, are contractual and neA"otiated
as distinguished from marital and law-imposed, and therefore
the enforcement of such payments by contempt proceedings
is precluded by the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt.
[6] With respect to the monthly payments for the wife,
the parties' express provision for the duration of such payments further shows that such payments represented "the
result of a bargain negotiated by [them) in adjustment of
their respective interests" in their property settlement rather
than the mere recognition of a law-imposed obligation. (Bradley v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.2d 509, 522.) Thus it
appears that the parties' agreement and decree provided for
monthly payments for the wife which were to continue for a
fixed period of five years regardless of the wife's remarriage
at any time within that period. Furthermore, the court could
not terminate but could only modify, subject to the contractuallimitation, such monthly payments. (Plu.mer v. Plumer,
supra, 48 Ca1.2d 820, 826.) Here again, if the provisions of
the agreement and decree for monthly payments for support
of the wife had been severable provisions for alimony, the
court could not have continued such payments beyond the
time of the wife's remarriage and could have terminated such
payments at any time upon a proper showing.
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[6] With reference to child support, there can be no doubt
that the law imposes an obligation on a father to furnish such
support, and the law-imposed obligation cannot be contracted
away by the parents. (Rasher v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.2d
556, 559-560 [71 P.2d 918].) [7] And where the obligation
to pay an agreed amount is made an integral part of a property settlement agreement, the payments ordinarily "are not
subject to reduction, but thE'Y might be increased by the court
if the child's welfare requires it, and that without regard to
what the liabilities of the parties may be, and their rights
inter se under the agreement." (Puckett v. Puckett, 21 Ca1.
2d 833, 843 [136 P.2d 1].) These rules merely recognize the
court's power to provide adequate support for the protection
of the interests of the child. (Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 126
Cal.App.2d 238, 244 [271 P.2d 910] ; Streeter v. Streeter, 67
Cal.App.2d 138, 144 [153 P.2d 441].) [8] While in the
present case, the child support obligation could have been
reduced by virtue of the agreement of the parties, the abovementioned contractual limitation upon the court's power to
make any such reduction clearly stamps the oblig-ation for
such child support payments as a contractual obligation rather
than a law-imposed obligation.
We therefore conclude that under the circumstances before
us, none of petitioner's contractual obligations can be enforced by contempt proceedings in view of the constitutional
prohibition against imprisonment for debt. (Bradley v.
Superior Cottrt, supra, 48 Ca1.2d 509, 522.) The foregoing
conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider the propriety of
the court's order reinstating the contempt sentence in the
absence of a concurrent finding of petitioner's then ability to
comply with the terms of payment.
The order dated September 28, 1955, adjudging petitioner
in contempt, and the order dated June 13, 1957, vacating the
suspension of sentence thereon, are annulled.
,'.

""

Gibson, C. J., Shenk;J., Schauer, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I concur in the conclusion reached in the
majority opinion annulling the orders which adjudge petitioner in contempt of court for his failure to pay amounts
provided for in an integrated property settlement agreement.
It will be recalled that when this case was previously before
this court (Plumer v. Plumer, 48 Ca1.2d 820 [313 P.2d 549])
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I pointed out in my dissenting opinion (p. 826 et seq.) that
the agreement in question was clearly an integrated property
settlement agreement and not subject to modification except as
provided in said agreement and that since the only condition
upon which said agreement could be modified had not occurred, the. trial court was justified in dismissing defendant's
application for modification of said agreement. It seems to
me to be clearly inconRistent for this court to hold, as it did
in its prior decision (48 Ca1.2d 820) that a property settlement agreement is subject to modification with respect to
payments to the wife, and yet the trial court has no power
to enforce such modified payments in a contempt proceeding.
This is the effect of the two decisions of this court involving
the property settlement agreement which is the subject of this
action. In other words, it was held by the majority in its
former decision (48 Ca1.2d 820) that the property settlement agreement here involved was subject to modification
upon a showing of changed conditions. Such holding led to
the inevitable conclusion that the payments constituted payments for support and maintenance which the trial court had
the power to exact from the husband and likewise had the
power to force him to make such payments by resort to the
extraordinary power of contempt. To now hold that the
payments were subject to modification and that the court has
no power to enforce the same by a contempt proceeding, is,
in my opinion, in direct conflict with the former holding of
this court (48 Ca1.2d 820). If, however, the payments constituted an integral part of an integrated property settlement
agreement, they clearly· fell within the rule announced by
this court in Bradley v. Superior Court, 48 Ca1.2d 509 [310
P.2d 634], and could not be enforced by a contempt proceeding. There seems to be no end to the intricacies which have
emerged from the unsound pronouncements of this court during the past four years since the majority of this court has
undertaken the extrajudicial function of rewriting property
I'lettlement agreements (Delder v. Dexter, 42 Ca1.2d 36 [265
P.2d 873] ; Fox v. Fox, 42 Ca1.2d 49 [265 P.2d 881] ; Flynn v.
Flynn,42 Ca1.2d 55 [265 P.2d 865]; Messenger v. Messenger.
46 Ca1.2d 619 [297 P.2d 988] ; Anderson v. Mart, 47 Cal.2<1
274 [303 P.2d 539]; Herda v. Herda, 48 Ca1.2d 228 [308
P.2d 705] ; Plumer v. Plumer, 48 Ca1.2d 820 [313 P.2d 549] ).
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent.
My views with respect to the enforcement of integrated
bargains by contempt proceedings are set forth in a dissenting
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opinion in Bradley v. Superior Court, 48 Ca1.2d 509, 523 [310
P.2d 634]. Although these views remain unchanged, I would
concur in the juugment herein under the compulsion of that
case if it necessarily controlled the present one.
The present case, however, differs from the Bradley case in
that plaintiff has not remarried and the payments are partly
for child support. Accordingly, the payments are partly in
lieu of the statutory obligation to support. In integrated bargains the monthly payments will ordinarily have a dual character. "To the extent that they are designed to discharge
the obligation of support and maintenance they will ordinarily
reflect the characteristics of that obligation and thus have
the indicia of alimony. [Citations.] On the other hand, to
the extent that they represent a division of the community
property itself, or constitute an inseparable part of the consideration for the property settlement, they are not alimony,
and accordingly cannot be modified without changing the
terms of the property settlement agreement of the parties."
(Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Ca1.2d 36, 41-42 [265 P.2d 873].) So
long as the wife has not remarried or there is a continuing obli·
gation of child support, the characteristics of the obligation
to support remain and alone justify enforcement by contempt.
Such a rule is implicit in Miller v. SlIperior Court, 9 Ca1.2d
733, 740 [72 P.2d 868], where the court took care to point
out that the payments were ordered pursuant to a property
settlement and could not be changed without the consent of
the parties. Although the majority rejected this reasoning in
the Bradley case, it had only to decide in that case whether
contempt would lie to enforce an integrated bargain after
the wife had remarried and the characteristics of the support
and maintenance obligation were no longer present.
A rule that the wife's right to enforce the agreement by
contempt terminates only on her remarriage would permit the
parties to make a final settlement of all their marital rights
without compelling the wife to..ghre up contempt enforcement
while she is still dependent·on her former husband for support. So long as the Bradley decision remains law, I would
adopt such a rule instead of following the Bradley rationale to
its logical extreme.

